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STERILIZATION OF MENTAL DEFECTIYIES*
BURKE SHARTEL**

In 1923 the legislature of Michigan passed an act "to authorize
the sterilization of mentally defective persons."' This act has recently
been sustained in its main provisions by the Michigan Supreme Court
in a case brought to test its constitutionality. 2 Probably the United
States Supreme Court will also have an opportunity to pass upon the
validity of this law, but the Michigan decision, although not final on
the question whether the sterilization of defectives is violative of the
"due process clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment, is nevertheless
very significant. It is the first instance so far as the writer can find
in which a court of last resort has sustained a law providing for what
is termed "eugenical sterilization."
A brief consideration of this
legislation ought therefore to be of interest.
Let us examine: I. The Provisions of the Michigan Act, and then
II. The Constitutional Power of the Legislature to Provide for Sterilization of Defectives.

THE PROVISIONS OF THE MICHIGAN AcT4

(a) Persons Subject to Sterilization. Sections 1 and 2: The
act is applicable to persons duly adjudged by the probate court to be
"mentally defective." "Mentally defective persons shall bc deemed to
include idiots, imbeciles and the feeble-minded, but not insane persons."
*This article, by arrangement between the editors, is published practically
simultaneously in the Medico-Legal Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1, and in this Journal.
**Professor of Law, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.

'Publc Acts, 1923, No. 285.
2

Smith v. Command, probate judge, decided on June 18, 1925, and reported

in 204 N. W. 140.
3In State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65 (1912), an act providing for sterilization
as a part of the punishment for rape was upheld; however, the law was attacked on the ground that this was cruel and unusual punishment and the court
was not required to and did not profess to pass upon the val'dity of sterilization as a eugenical measure. And since this article was written the Supreme
Court of Appeals has sustained the validity of a eugen'cal sterilization act.
Buck v. Bell (Va. 1925) 130 S. E. 516. See Comment on this case in March,
1926, issue of the Michigan Law Review. (See further on questions of constitutionality,
the latter portion of the present article.)
4
The writer drew the Michigan Act. However, he had no personal interest
in it, nor part in initiating or sponsoring it; the draft was made at the instance
of an organization interested in social welfare work.
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One of the main contentions of counsel for Willie Smith in the
instant case was that the sterilization statute makes an unconstitutional
classification-"it selects out of the mentally defective only idiots, imbeciles, and feeble-minded." ' Why should the insane be excluded from
its operation? Chief Justice McDonald in holding the classification
-made by the statute not to be arbitrary or unreasonable, suggests two
reasons why it is proper. "While we do not know, of course, what
the legislature had in mind, it is reasonable to suppose they knew
that the insane have less of the sexual impulses than the feeble-minded,
and that biological science has not so definitely demonstrated their
inheritable tendencies."6 And in the brief of the attorney general it
is said, "Undoubtedly insane persons were exempted because it is
usually necessary to confine them in institutions and the great majority
of them would not be safe at large even though sterilized and the
insane persons who are not confined in institutions are either curable
or do not, as a class, show any tendency toward sexual relations, as is
the case with idiots," etc.7 The long and short of the matter is, practical experience requires a distinction to be made between the feebleminded and the insane. That is what makes this classification a natural and reasonable one.8
A feeble-minded person is a mental dwarf, a person whose mind
has never developed, sometimes because his ancestors are also underdeveloped mentally, sometimes because of disease, or of an accident
at birth or in early childhood; but always he is a person with subnormal
mentality. The insane person is in theory at least a person who has
at one time enjoyed normal mentality, but who has owing to disease
or accident lost it. Roughly, the distinction between the two is that
between a person who never has a complete mnind, and a person who
does have one but loses it through the action of disease or accident.
5At p. 44 et seq. of the brief. A number of points raised by counsel and
discussed by the court are not of sufficiently general interest to be discussed in
this article-such as, for example, whether the statute corresponds to its title,
whether the statute clearly provides what court shall have jurisdiction to order
sterilization, and whether it makes provision for the payment of medical fees.
There are faults in the act; but many of the criticisms directed at its provisions are not sound at all; they are due to unfamiliarity with the matter in
hand. While other criticisms are explainable in the sense that whoever enters,
as legislator or draftsman, into a constitutional "no man's land" like the field
of sterilization, is certain to be shot at from all sides.
GAt
p. 143.
7
At p. 7.
8The writer is greatly indebted to Dr. Harley A. Haynes for advice on
points touching the feeble-minded, which are discussed in this article. Dr.
Haynes was from 1907-1912 Assistant Medical Director of the Michigan Institution for the Care of the Feeble-minded, and from 1912-1924 the Medical Director;
he is at present Director of the University of Michigan Hospital at Ann Arbor.
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We would not need any special experience to confirm the impression
that these mental children, who are only too often endowed with normal
sexual power and appetite, but entirely devoid of ordinary feelings
of shame, responsibility, and so on, would require different care, and
would present different social problems, from the mental adults who
are affected by disease, possibly only late in life or only in one limited
mental sphere. Perhaps the most marked characteristic of the feebleminded-and this ought to weigh heavily in making a distinction such
as we are discussing-is the hopelessness of cure. It is as much, but
no more, according to human experience, to cause a feeble-minded
person to attain full mentality as it is to cause an adult dwarf to grow
to normal stature. To be sure, few cases of insanity are ever cured
either, but some are. And if nothing else is to be considered, the
affectionate hope of the insane man's relatives for a restoration of the
personality which they once knew and cherished, is worthy of some
consideration. The relatives of the feeble-minded man have never
known him other than he is and they can hardly wish him to have
children. Besides these differences, there are the differences pointed
out in the passages above quoted-the difference in the probability of
uncontrollable sexual impulses, the difference in the degree of proof
that insanity and feeble-mindedness respectively are inheritable, and
the difference as regards the effectiveness of sterilization as a means of
fitting the two classes of persons for life outside of an institution.
An appreciation of these various differences we find already expressed
in legislation establishing separate institutions for the care of the
insane and for the care of the feeble-minded respectively. The sterilization act under consideration applies to just that class of persons who
under laws of long standing are subject to be committed to institutions for the care of the feeble-minded.
Another reason for criticizing the classification made in the act, is
stated in the question of Wiest, J., "Where is the borderline between
the feeble-minded to be sterilized and those to be left immune?",, As
said by Judge Lumpkin, "The mind grades up from zero to the intellectual boiling point so gradually that dogmatic tests are of little
value." 10 Can-we or can we not fix a standard of mental defectiveness, or as we more commonly express it,. feeble-mindedness? There
is much authority, medical and scientific, to the effect that this is an
impossible task. So that considered in this light, and all by itself, the
legal problem here presented might appear insurmountable. But have
DAt p. 151,
' 0 in Slaughter v. Heath, 127 Ga. 747, 57 S. E. 69 (1907).
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we not many other problems like this? Take the standard to which
we so commonly refer-the ordinary prudent man. Where is he?
just how shall we know him? Where is the "borderline" between
him and the careless man? Again consider the cases where insanity
comes in question. Our courts are called on daily to draw an impossible line between sanity and insanity, and on their decisions may
depend property rights, or liberty of person, or even the question of
life or death. And finally, our statutes already provide for the commitment of feeble-minded persons. Certainly the issue of feeblemindedness or normal-mindedness is no different in substance whether
it occurs in a sterilization or in a commitment case; and certainly, too.
sterilization is not a more momentous result of this issue of fact than is
a perhaps permanent and involuntary confinement. The sum and
substance of the matter is, the law cannot "back away from" this
question simply because it is hard to decide. We are no more apt
to get different views in different cases as to who is feeble-minded,
than we are to find different courts or juries taking divergent views
on whether a certain defendant's conduct has been, in a particular situation, that of a reasonably prudent man. Perhaps, scientifically speaking, people cannot be classified, cannot be put into two, three, or even
more classes with lines drawn between. But what is good scientific
theory is not necessarily good law. The law has "to speak in general
terms-we have not gotten to the point of furnishing a law for each
case and never shall. The law must classify persons, things, acts, and
so on-and in so doing, it has to draw what general practical lines
it can. The best the law can do in many situations is to set up a general standard and trust to common sense to secure a reasonably uniform
application of it. A general standard to serve in this way, which the
writer suggests on the basis of a formulated test of the Royal College
of Physicians, London, is this-a feeble-minded person is one who,
because of inherent or acquired mental weakness, cannot compete on
equal terms with his fellowmen, and cannot manage himself and his
affairs with ordinary prudence."'
Numerically the class of persons subject to sterilization under the
Michigan act is not large. There are perhaps twenty thousand feebleminded persons in the state,'12 according to Chief Justice McDonald.
This would not be too many to sterilize, considering the population as
"Wiest, J., refers to this test with disapproval at p. 151 in his opinion. His
objections are, however, scientific only, and are answered, it is submitted, by
what is said above.
12This is roughly one person in two hundred-an estimate with which Dr.
Haynes agrees. See note 8 above.
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a whole, but the fact is, it would never be necessary to sterilize all of
these persons; many of the feeble-minded never arrive at sexual maturity or never become social problems in a sexual sense.'"
In the earlier sterilization acts other classes of persons are included
along with the feeble-minded-for example, criminals, epileptics, habitual drunkards, and morons. This inclusion seems to the writer bad
policy. 14 As compared with the difficulty of deciding whether a man
is a moron or a normal person, the difficulty of deciding between a
feeble-minded man and a normal person would be as nothing. Our
intelligence tests and other standards are usually considered by experts
to be tolerably satisfactory for detecting gross inadequacy of mind
(such as feeble-mindedness), but hardly reliable at all for testing the
higher degrees of intelligence. Moreover all of the arguments about
the lack of evidence to show the inheritability of feeble-mindedness can
be made in regard to criminals, epileptics, habitual drunkards, and
morons-and with much more force. The proof that some form of
social inferiority will be passed on to offspring by these persons is
far from conclusive. So that the present act is certainly stronger in
both a constitutional and a practical sense for leaving these classes
out. The constitutionality of any sterilization measure will depend
primarily on whether it is calculated to meet a well-proven social danger. And on the policy side-if we are going to sterilize for eugenical
reasons, it is better to begin where the need is clearest, and to adopt
a modest program which will not discredit the whole idea at the start.15
(b) Application for Sterilization Order. Section 3 specifies who
may apply for an order to sterilize an adjudged defective-to wit: certain relatives, certain public officers and "any person whom the judge
of probate, upon examination into the facts and circumstances of any
particular case, shall determine to be a proper person to make such
application."
"Said order may be made at the time when the person is adjudged
defective or at any later time."
13 See further regarding the age of persons subject to sterilization, post"(d) The Necessary Findings of Fact."
'4For all the legislation on this subject, see pp. 1-50 in Laughlin, Eugenical
Sterilization (1922), published as a report of the Psychopathic Laboratory of
the Municipal Court of Chicago. See also a number of acts and proposed acts
in AMAERICAN JOURNAL OF CRIIaINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, Vol. 5, p. 535,
Vol. 7, p. 611, and Vol. 8, p. 126.
15Chief Justice McDonald, at page 145, says: "In comparison, our statute
is much more reasonable and conservative than the laws of other states. ...
The Michigan statute is not perfect. Undoubtedly time and experience will
bring changes in many of its workable features."
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This section leaves it open to almost anyone who could properly
desire to obtain a sterilization order to make application for itwhether he acts in the interest of the defective (see Section 8 below) or
of the public (see Section 7 below). At the same time there is some
check on indiscriminate applications, in the requirement of the judge's
approval as provided in the passage quoted.
(c) Notice, Examination, Hearing and Appeal. Section 4 directs
that a day for hearing the application be fixed, and notice thereof be
served personally at least ten days beforehand, on the defective if over
the age of ten, on the public prosecutor and on certain relatives, or if
none of these can be found upon a guardian ad litem to be appointed
by the court.1"
And "in its discretion the court may cause notice to be served in
any part of the state upon any relative of the defective or upon any
interested person."
Section 5: The court shall cause the defective to be examined by
three reputable physicians with a view to obtaining their ' opinion
17
whether he "should be dealt with under the terms of this act.
16
The appointment of a guardian to receive service of notice and represent
the defective at the hearing is mandatory, where the designated relatives cannot
be served. In the Willie Smith case the guardian ad litem was not appointed
until a month after the petition for steril zation was heard and submitted. The
guardian then filed objections to the sterilization order and appealed. This the
court held was not a substantial compliance with the statute so as to confer
jurisdiction to make the order. The statute "contains specific provis'ons as
to the procedure in such cases. When the petition is filed, an order of hearing
shall be made and served as directed in section 4. A copy must be served on
the guardian ad litein. Clearly, the guardian must be appointed when the order
of hearing is made." (At p.-145.)
However, in the instant case the court seems to have overlooked the fact
that the petition for sterilization was filed by the defective's father with the
mother's consent. In view of this it is not easy to see how these relatives cannot "be found"; indeed, they appear to have notice just as if they had been
served. And it is only when none of the relatives designated can be served, that
the appointment of a guardian ad litem is mandatory. The guardian was named
the probate court in the exercise of its general powers.
here by
171n the Willie Smith case the physicians merely filed a certificate setting
out their opinions in the terms of the statutory required find ngs; the court
held this was not a compliance with the statute.
McDonald, C. 3., says: "There is no provision for the filing of certificates
made by the physicians. The procedure is in no way similar to that provided
for on petitions to commit to an insane asylum. L. Comp. Laws, 1915, Art.
1325, section 5 provides that: 'The court shall cause the defective to be ex-

amined by three reputable physicians

. . . with a view to obtaining the

opinion of said physicians on the question whether the adjudged defective should
be dealt with under the terms of this act.' The intent is clear that the physicians shall appear in court at the hearing and submit to an examination by
the court, the prosecuting attorney, the guardian or other person upon whom
notice has been served. The certificates filed in this case are simnly statements
in the language of the statute that the facts are present which the court must
find to warrant the making of the order. -It is not for the physicians to determine the question before the court. While, of course, they may express their
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Section 6: "The court shall take full evidence in writing at the
hearing 8 as to the mental and physical condition of -the adjudged
defective and the history of his case and shall, if no jury is required,
determine whether he is a person subject to be dealt with under this
act for his own welfare (sec. 8 below) or the welfare of the community" (see. 7 below).
On the motion of the court, or demand of the defective or the
guardian or relative representing him, the hearing shall be by jury.
The defective shall have the right to be present at the hearing
"unless it shall appear to the court by certificate of two reputable
physicians" that this would be "improper or unsafe."
Section 9: Any defective ordered sterilized may appeal on the
same terms as a person found feeble-minded may appeal, and while the
appeal is pending, the order shall be suspended.
These sections follow largely the provisions of the Michigan
statutes covering the commitment of the feeble-minded 9 and the
insane.20 Wherever a departure has been made from the older models,
it has always been made with the idea of safeguarding more carefully
the rights of the person sought to be sterilized. 2 ' In commenting Pn
these parts of the act, McDonald, C. J., says:
"Nothing further is required by the 'due process clause' of the
Constitution." And further: "In examining the recorded decisions
of other jurisdictions, we have read the sterilization statutes of ten
states. In most of them the matter of determining whether a defective
shall be dealt with undef the act is left to an administrative officer or
board. In the Michigan statute that matter is left to court procedure
opinions concerning it, the reasons for such opinions should be inquired into in
order that the court may, after due consideration thereof and of the other proof
submitted, as provided for in section 6, determine whether the person examined
should be dealt with under the terms of the act. Section 6 reads: 'The court
shall take full eidence in writing at the hearing as to the mental and physical
condition of the adjudged defective and the history of his case.' No witnesses
were examined. This prQvis:on is mandatory, and must be complied with. No
more important duty devolves on a probate judge than that imposed on him
under this act. The responsibility of determining that a surgical operation shall
be performed on a human being who is mentally defective 'for his own welfare
or the welfare of the community' rests upon h m, and it may properly be discharged by him only on the most painstaking and thorough investigation of the
facts disclosed upon the hearing." (At pp. 145, 6.)
' 8 See the statements of the court in the preceding note.
19Compiled Laws, 1915, secs. 1546, 1547.
20
Compiled Laws, 1915, secs. 1324, 1325.
21
For example, here the provisions as to the appointment of a guardian
ad litem are mandatory in some cases, and the defective or his relatives or his
guardian may demand a jury trial, and notice musI be served ten days instead
of twenty-four hours before hearing, and the provisions as to the hearing are
somewhat more specific.
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and judicial determination, aided by the expert knowledge of three
competent physicians. Tle distinguishing feature of our statute is
found in these provisions, and in the safeguards which it throws around
those of the class who have not the inherited tendencies which bring
them within the operation of the law. It provides for a jury trial and
the right of appeal. It requires all testimony to be taken in writing
22
and a complete record made, so that it may be reviewed.
Eugenicists, physicians and other scientists may not heartily approve the policy of requiring a judicial or jury hearing in all sterilization cases; they are apt to be impressed with the unfitness of courts
and juries to pass upon these highly technical questions of fact. But
as a matter of constitutional right the person to be sterilized cannot
be deprived of "his day in court." He is entitled to a fair and impartial
hearing, and an opportunity to present testimony, examine and crossexamine witnesses, and so on. Even if medical boards could be created
to serve as expert triers in these cases, there seems to be little practical advantage in setting up boards to perform this function. Our
courts are already organized and operating; they pass on many other
questions quite as difficult; they must base their findings on the opinions of experts anyhow; and finally, the findings of any board of experts which might be substituted would have to be subject to court
review in order to meet constitutional requirements, and a review here
would not be substantially different from a judicial hearing in the first
place.
(d)
The Necessary Findings of Fact. Section 7 (1): The
court shall order sterilization whenever upon the hearing it shall be
found"(a)
That the said defective manifests sexual inclinations which
make it probable that he will procreate children unless he be closely
confined, or be rendered incapable of procreation;
22
At p. 144. In Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526 (1921), the Supreme Court
of Indiana held unconstitutional, as denying due process of law, the Indiana
act, "authorizing the board of managers of inst:tutions intrusted with the care of
confirmed criminals and defectives and a committee of experts to perform an
operation of vasectomy on an inmate, in cases pronounced unimprovable, to
prevent procreation, but giving the inmate no opportunity for a hearing or to
cross-examine the experts who decided upon the operat'on, or to establish that
he was not with'n the class designated in the statute."
See comment on this case in 20 Mich. L. Rev. 101. Compare also Davis v.
Berry, 216 Fed. 413. However in Buck v. Bell (Va. 1925) 130 S. E. 516, decided since this article was written, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
has sustained the validity of a statute which provided merely for a hearing by a
board. See comment on this case in March, 1926, number of the Michigan Law
Review.
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"(b) That children procreated by said adjudged defective will
have an inherited tendency to mental defectiveness; and
"(c) That there is no probability that the condition of said person will improve so that his or her children will not have the inherited
23
tendency aforesaid." (Italics ours. )
These findings were the object of more direct or implied criticism
by court and counsel than anything else in the act. And yet they are
absolutely fundamental. One only needs to examine the many enacted
or proposed sterilization statutes, set out in LAUGHLIN'S EUGENICAL

to find that every draftsman of a sterilization act has
felt obliged to require findings of somewhat similar purport. In every
case coming before the court the ultimate fact to be found is, this
defective needs to be sterilized for the social good. The findings here
required are simply facts upon which that conclusion is based. The
writer believes one cannot say a defective ought to be sterilized without finding or assuming every fact here mentioned. Now let us consider these findings separately.
1. Manifestation of "sexual inclinations." Clark, J., regards
this as an unnecessary finding, a finding of something obvious. He
cites the brief of counsel to the effect that this finding "may be satisfied by evidence that the subject is either male or female." 24 This
opinion cannot, however, be supported by the word of experts in this
field. The clause in question was inserted upon the advice of such
experts. Dr. Harley A. Haynes, who had charge of the Home for
Feeble-minded at Lapeer for many years, says a large percent of
feeble-minded persons are infantile in sexual development either physically or mentally or both and always remain so. Many also die
before they reach maturity. As to all these, sterilization is quite unnecessary. It is therefore desirable to include this finding of "sexual
inclinations"-based on attempts at intercourse, solicitation to intercourse, or whatever else would show a probability that the defective
will "procreate children."
Another aspect of the finding of "sexual inclinations which make
it probable he will procreate children" is that this finding serves virSTERILIZATION,

2
3Section 7 (2) provides for sterilization likewise where it is found-"(a)
That sa:d defective manifests sexual inclinat'ons which make it probable that
he will procreate children unless he be closely confined, or be rendered incapable
of procreation; and (b) That he would not be able to support and care for his
children, if any, and such children would probably become public charges by
reason of his own mental defect'veness." (Italics ours.)
This part of the act is held unconst'tutional without, however, affecting the
validity of section 7 (1). See opin'ons pp. 144, 148, 150.
24At p. 146.
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tually as a requirement that the person sterilized be over the age of
puberty.2 5 This is important, for sterilization before maturity does
have serious effects upon the development of the individual, while
26
sterilization thereafter does not.
2. That children of the defective will have an inherited tendency
to mental defectiveness. Here we are on less certain ground. Can
these facts be determined? Many think they cannot. All the justices
who write opinions in the Willie Smith case call attention to this difficulty and stress the point that this and the other findings must be based
on evidence. In particular, Mr. Justice Clark says:
"But what of paragraph (b) ? Can it be determined as a scientific
fact upon competent evidence that a child not in being, but to be procreated, 'will have an inherited tendency to mental defectiveness'?
I have grave doubts that paragraph (b) is capable of proof,
and, before sterilization can be ordered, such finding must be made and
27
it must be based on evidence.
The difficulty of proof is not one which appeals to the average
man at all. He takes it for granted that all kinds of traits can be
shown to pass from one generation to the one which follows. The
writer has yet to find a man of only fair education who disapproves
of the policy of ugenical sterilization when that policy is stated for
his opinion. Scientifically, however, the case is not so clear. Many
scientists question, whether the probability of transmitting mental defect to offspring can be found as a "scientific fact. ' 28 The great majority think that it can be. But whichever opinion one accepts as one's
personal view, the conclusion reached by Mr. Justice Clark must be
accepted as sound. He puts aside his doubts and says the finding of a
"tendency" must be made on the facts of each particular case, just as
the act provides. The Supreme Court is emphatically not warranted,
on the basis of existing scientific opinion, in declaring as a matterof law that the probability of transmitting mental defect is not possible
of proof.
In substance and effect the act requires a finding of a reasonable
probability that this feeble-minded individual will transmit mental
25
Wiest, J., overlooks this point, for he assumes that the operation may be
performed on infants-this appears from his frequent references to eunuchs and

from his reference to the "ablation of sexual organs . . . in infancy," at
p. 152.
26
0f course, when (if ever) such ster'lization is indicated as the proper

med:cal treatment for a particular individual, it is permissible under the provisions of section 8.
-7At
p. 146.
2
SFor example, the late Dr. Walter E. Fernald and Dr. William A. White.
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defect to his children. If mental defect is inheritable at all, this finding
is not so hard to support as one might suppose on first thought. Normal persons seldom mate with the feeble-minded. A feeble-minded
man can rarely lure a normal woman into marriage or illicit intercourse.
-A normal man will quite as rarely marry a woman with the mentality
of a small child; he may perhaps have illicit intercourse with her in an
unbridled moment. Feeble-minded persons are, as it has been expressed, "a different kind of people"; their marriages are naturally
and usually with persons of their own sort. And, of course, the
probability of feeble-mindedness in the offspring of two feeble-minded
persons is very great.2 9 If it be true that normal persons and feebleminded persons seldom intermarry, what can it profit the opponent of
sterilization to show that a large percentage of the fruit of such unions
would be of sound mind? He can derive no comfort from the soundness
of their children born out of wedlock. The long and short of the matter is, one cannot consider in the abstract what this or that feebleminded individual's contribution to a bad heredity will be, and ignore
the probability that his legitimate offspring will suffer from "a double
dose."
3. That there is no probability that the condition of said person
will improve so that his children will not have the inherited tendencyto mental defectiveness. In the light of what has been said about the
incurability of feeble-mindedness, it might have been proper to omit
this third finding entirely; the courts might have taken judicial notice
of these medical facts; however these facts are not hard to deal vtith
where the evidence is sufficient as to the others. As Mr. Justice Clark
says, if a finding can be made that the children of the defective will
29

Dr. Will~am A. White, an avowed opponent of sterilization laws, says,
"I challenge you or any other person to point to one of these carefully worked
out families and give me in a single instance a pred'ction of what the heredity
of any one of the numerous individuals therein contained will be as shown by
our charts that it actually is. Now if we cannot predict, we have no right to
interfere. It is s:mply and solely to my mind a case of 'fools rushing in where
angels fear to tread' and I have absolutely no sympathy with any such legislation
for that reason. I have yet to see a chart upon which an absolute prediction
could be made, except perhaps in the case of the union of two feeble-minded
persons, and even there I would want to know sonwthin.q about the basis for the
diagnosis of feeble-mindedness." (Italics ours.)
And again, "It is out of the question to undertake to predict what sort of
progeny he will have without taking into consideration the individual with
whom he is going to mate, and this is precisely the feature in all matters of sterilization that is not taken into account. It is always practically unknown."
(Extracts from a letter to Mr. William Van Dyke, counsel for Willie Smith,
set out in the brief, at p. 99 et seq.)
With deference it is submitted that Dr. White himself reaches his conclusions "without taking into consideration the individual with whom he (the
feeble-minded person) is going to mate."
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have an inherited tendency to mental defectiveness, ihis finding that
there is no prospect of change or improvement can also be made. And
since these facts must be found or assumed, their inclusion among the
required findings of fact can hardly be seriously objected to.30
(e) Sterilization for the Welfare of the Defective. The present
act provides primarily for sterilization as a social welfare measure.
The notion is that the defective with his feeble mentality and procreative tendencies is a serious social menace. Under Section 8, however, sterilization for the defective's own welfare may be ordered by
the court. "The court may, with the consent of the parents or guardian" order sterilization "whenever at such hearing it shall be found
that the mental or physical condition of said defective would be substantially improved by such operation or treatment, or such operation
or treatment is otherwise for the welfare of such defective."
The physician may sterilize a patient just as he may give his
patient any other form of medical or surgical treatment, viz., for the
latter's good. In so doing, he is "taking no chances" if the patient is a
normal adult person and consents to be sterilized, and probably not if
the patient is a minor whose parents consent in its behalf and in its
interest, But the situation is not always so dear. Can a parent consent to the sterilization of his adult feeble-minded son, for example?
Can a guardian authorize the sterilization of his ward for the ward's
good, either with or without court order? These and other doubts
might arise. Physician's have been sterilizing the feeble-minded not
infrequently (so the writer is reliably informed), provided the consent
of what are regarded as the proper persons may be obtained. Practically the risk here has not been great, but occasionally a serious lawsuit might result. ,This statute offers the physician and other interested persons a safe way in which to proceed.
(f) The Operation or Treatment. Under Sections 2 and 10 the
"court may, after hearing as herein provided, order such treatment
by X-rays or the operation of vasectomy or salpingectomy or other
treatment as may be least dangerous to life to render said defective
incapable of procreation." 31 The court "shall direct a competent phy30
This type of finding which occurs in almost all of the statutes is said by
Mr. Laughlin to be "bad biology." It "implies that an individual may, because
of his condition, be today a potent'al parent of defectives and undesirables, and
in the future on account of some recovery, may become so changed that parenthood on his or her part becomes des'rable for the state. This is equivalent to
saying that an individual may be a mongrel today and a thoroughbred tomorrow,
which, of course, is contrary to all practical observation and to all biological
teaching," "Eugenical Sterilization," p. 113. But practically, whether "bad
biology" or not, it is perhaps wise to include this finding; we cannot expect our
courts always to know and take judicial notice of the views of biologists.
31Section 10 is borrowed from the earlier Michigan Sterilization Act.
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sician or surgeon with proper assistance to perform said operation or
give said treatment."
Regarding these sections, McDonald, C. J., says, "But the methods
provided by the statute to accomplish its purpose are not cruel or
inhuman. It requires treatment by X-rays or the operation of vasectomy on males or salpingectomy on females, or other treatment as .may
be least dangerous to life. These operations are the least radical
known to medical science. None of them require the removal of any
of the organs or sex glands; the result being accomplished by a severance of the sex germ-carrying ducts. The operation does not destroy
sexual desires or capacity for sexual intercourse, but renders procreation impossible.

3 2'

Speaking medically, none of the three forms of operation or treatment mentioned in the statute is very dangerous (in a proper case).
Vasectomy (in males) may be done in a few minutes under local
anesthetic. Salpingectomy (the corresponding operation in females)
is, of course, more serious; it requires a general anesthetic and an
abdominal incision; but it is not attended with the dangers of most
abdominal operations, because here the patient goes into the operation
while in good health. X-ray treatment, often used to sterilize women,
has some definite limitations. It is quite as serious as is the surgical
operation. Also sterilization by this method is not always sure. And
finally X-ray treatment is only advisable as a method for sterilizing
women over forty; in younger women it is apt to produce serious
physical and psychic consequences, because it destroys all functions
of the sex glands and brings on a premature menopause. The sex
glands in both men and women perform two general functions-a
reproductive function and a function of internal secretion, closely
related to general mental and physical well-being. The surgical operations mentioned consist in the severance of ducts necessary in reproduction, but they do not disturb the secretive function of the glands,
33
nor affect the well-being of the patient.
II
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO PROVIDE FOR STERILIZATION OF DEFECTIVES-PURPOSE OF PRESENT AcT

In the opinion of Chief Justice McDonald are well stated the
reasons on which four justices of the Supreme Court sustain the legisof the opinion.
The writer is indebted for the medical facts here stated to Dr. Hugh
Cabot, dean, Dr. E. A. Pohle, assistant professor of roentgenology, and Dr.
32At p. 142
33
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lative power to provide for eugenical sterilization, as well as the legislative purpose and policy in passing such an act. He says"From this and a great quantity of other evidence to which we
will not here refer, it definitely appears that science has demonstrated
to a reasonable degree of certainty that feeble-mindedness is hereditary.
This fact, now well known with its alarming results, presents a social
and economic problem of grave importance. It is known by conservative estimate that there are at least 20,000 recognized feebleminded persons in the state of Michigan-eight times as many as can
be segregated in state institutions. The Michigan Home and Training
School at Lapeer is full to overflowing with these unfortunates, and
hundreds of others are on the waiting lists. That they are a serious
menace to society no one will question.
"In view of these facts, what are the legal rights of this class of
citizens as to the procreation of children? It is true that the right to
beget children is a natural and constitutional right, but it is equally
true that no citizen has any rights superior to the common welfare.
Acting for the public good, the state, in the exercise of its police
powers, may always impose reasonable restrictions upon the natural
and constitutional rights of its citizens. Measured by its injurious
effect upon society, what right has any citizen or class of citizens to
beget children with an inherited tendency to crime, feeble-mindedness,
idiocy, or imbecility? This is the right for which Willie Smith is here
contending. It is a right which this statute, enacted for the common
welfare, denies to him. The facts and conditions which we have here
related were all before the Michigan Legislature. Under the existing
circumstances it was not only its undoubted right, but it was its duty,
to enact some legislation that would protect the people and preserve the
race from the known effects of the procreation of children by the
feeble-minded, the idiots, and the imbeciles

.

.

.

this statute, meas-

ured by the purpose for which it was enacted and the conditions which
is a
warranted it, and justified by the findings of biological science,
34
proper and reasonable exercise of the police power of the state."
Squarely to the contrary effect on the vital issues here discussed
is the opinion of justice Wiest, dissenting:
"This act violates the Constitution, goes beyond the police power,
and is void. -I am wholly at variance with the theories sanctioned by
the Chief Justice. The bodies of citizens may not, under legislative
N. F. Miller, assistant professor of gynecology, of the University of Michigan
medical faculty.
34At p. 142,
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mandate, be cut into, and power of procreation destroyed by ligation
or mutilation of glands or carving out of organs. It is not my pur- pose to trench upon legislative prerogative, neither shall I hesitate to
view the whole subject involved in this claimed exercise of the police
power. Conceding the power of government to protect society from
the evils of preventable human deterioration, I cannot agree that this
power extends to the mutilation of the organs or glands of generation
of citizens or any class thereof. The power to segregate exists, and'
the protection afforded thereby is ample.
,!The inherent right of mankind to pass through life without mutilation of organs or glands of generation needs no declaration in constitutions, for the right existed long before constitutions or government, was not lost or surrendered to legislative control in the creation
of government, and is beyond the reach of the governmental agency
known as the police power." 3
The constitutional issue is here well marked-five justices (Clark,
J., only with "reluctance ' and "doubt") hold that eugenical sterilization is within the "police power" of the state, while three justices think
that it is not. We cannot strongly disapprove of the dissent of the
minority nor of Mr. Justice Clark's doubts; the issue is certainly new
and very delicately balanced. 36 However, it does not seem possible to
support, on any modern theory of rights or constitutional limitations,
the broad language of Mr. Justice Wiest, in which he denies utterly all
legislative power to provide for sterilization. Rather his meaning must
be taken to be that the exercise of such power is not necessary or
advisable in any sense, and would accordingly be arbitrary, unreason3GAt pp. 146, 149.
36AII of the decisions touching sterilization of defectives, and much other
useful material, legal, medical and eugenical, is collected in Laughlin, "Eugenical Sterilization."
According to counsel for Willie Smith, sterilization acts have been passed
in nine states (not counting the present act), declared unconstitutional in eight,
and upheld in one. Counsel cites the following cases: Mickle v. Henrichs (Nev.),
262 Fed. 687; Smith v. Board of Exam;ners, 85 N. J. L. 146; Haynes v. Judge,
201 Mich. 138; Davis v. Berry (Ia.), 216 Fed. 413; Williams v. Smith, 190
Ind. 526; Osborne v. Thompson (N. Y.), 185 Ap. Div. 902, 103 Misc. 32; Cline
v. Oregon (Circ, Ct., 1921), en banc Dept. 1; State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65 (held
constitutional to provide for sterilization as part of punishment for rape).
In California the statute was declared unconstitutional by the attorney general. Acts were vetoed in Pennsylvania, Oregon, Vermont, Nebraska, and
Idaho. The acts are apparently in force in Connecticut, Wisconsin, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas and Washington.
In all of the cases cited where the sterilization act has been held invalid, the
decision has turned on some other point (such as improper class'fication, deprival of opportunity for fair hearing, cruel and unusual punishment) than the
question of power to provide for eugenical sterilization, though in some of them
doubts regarding this power are expressed. (Cf. Davis v. Berry and Smith v,
Board of Examiners, supra.)
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able and unconstitutional, for as McDonald, C. J., says at another point
in his opinion: "It is an historic fact that every forward step in the
progress of the race is marked by an interference with individual liberties.

' 37

If the social need be great enough the state can deprive of

liberty (as it does do with the insane, the criminal, the man who objects to vaccination, and so on) or it may take life (as it does as a
penalty for crime or by drafting into the military service and exposing
to death, etc.). The real issue seems to be whether in fact, as McDonald, C. J., says, "Science has demonstrated to a reasonable degree that
feeble-mindedness is hereditary," or at least that it is hereditary in
enough cases to justify a resort to a strenuous measure like sterilization. The turning point is the degree of the social danger from the
transmission of feeble-mindedness to posterity. Closely connected with
the question of social danger is also the question of the effectiveness of
sterilization as a means of meeting that danger. As to both questions
the most that can be said 'is "We are not sure." We cannot say "beyond rational doubt," however, that the legislative notions on these
questions are wrong. Simple doubt of the wisdom or policy of a
statute is not decisive against its constitutionality. The sterilization
statute is "expressive of a state policy apparently based on the growing
belief that, due to the alarming increase in the number of degenerates,
criminals, feeble-minded, and insane, our race is facing the greatest
peril of all time. Whether this belief is well founded is not for this
court to say. Unless for the soundest constitutional reasons, it is our
duty to sustain the policy which the state has adopted.

' 8
.

And Clark,

J., says, "But doubts should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
act. With reluctance I have concluded to concur in the result reached
by Mr. Justice McDonald."3
This attitude of solving all doubts in favor of the validity of the
law seems particularly appropriate in a situation like the one surrounding the sterilization act. The decision of the court as well as
the decision of the legislature must be based largely on medical facts
or at least on facts rather special in character. When the Supreme
Court passes on the constitutionality of a "police power" measure it
exercises a sort of supervisory fact-finding power like that which it
exercises with regard to jury findings of fact. The legislature has
before it certain evidence which it deems to justify the enactment of a
certain law. It does enact it. The Supreme Court then has the duty
(in a test case) of deciding whether the facts reasonably justified the
37At p. 145.

38McDonald, C. J., at p. 145.
39At p. 146.
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conclusion and action of the law-making body. But the evidence of
these facts is not contained in a record made up from the examination
and cross-examination of witnesses, as a record in a jury case would
be. The facts which affect constitutionality appear for the most part
outside the record of the particular case. 40 For example, in the present
case the record before the Supreme Court contained only a perfunctory certificate of the physicians, following the terms of the statutory
required findings, to the effect that Willie Smith should be sterilized.
How can the Supreme Court know that it is fully informed as to the
facts? How is it to get its information? And if it is not properly
informed, how can the court intelligently discharge its constitutional
function? The legislature is not heard, nor is the court required to
have any part of the legislative record before it. The court must
depend chiefly on the briefs of counsel for the evidence of the facts as
well as for the usual legal argument. (The brief of counsel for Willie
400n this general subject see an excellent article by Henry Wolf Bikl6,

"Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action," 38 Harv. L. R. 6. In part that author says: "Moreover, these underlying questions of fact, which condition the constitutionality of
the legislation, are at times questions on which the layman feels justified in
forming his own opinion and in declining to yield it to that of the judge, at
least when the judge bases his determination, not on evidence produced in the
case before him, but on his general information-the same foundation upon
which the layman builds his conclusion. As an example, the layman may be
quite ready to defer to the opinion of the court when the decis.on requires a
definition of the legal significance of the phrase 'ex post facto law'; but when
the court decides that a law limiting the hours that people may work in bakeshops has no substantial relation to the promotion of the public health, he is
inclined to doubt the finality of this finding since he knows of no particular
reason for supposing that the judges are better able to decide such a question
than other intelligent persons, unless their. determination is based upon evidence
produced before them in the usual way, carefully weighed and considered.
"Since it is believed that a substantial part of the cr'ticism which has been
levelled against the exercise by the judiciary of the power to hold legislation
unconstitutional is due to the fact that decisions have been made which turn on
the resolution of these underlying quest'ons of fact, it has seemed worth while
to consider how the courts should be enlightened with reference to such questions,
so that their determinations may be based upon correct information and not

upon assumption. . .

"The validity of the Massachusetts vaccination statute turned essentially
on the question whether such a requ'rement was an arbitrary interference with
personal liberty and therefore a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution; and, as in the bakeshop case, this question could only be resolved by
an intelligent consideration of the efficacy of vaccination." (At pp. 7, 11.)
Cf., the remarks of A. B. Hall, Popular Government, pp. 185-193.
And in Gitlow v. People of the State of New York (1925) 45 Sup. Ct. Rep.
625, the United States Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Sanford
says, "By enacting the present statute the state has determined, through its legislative body, that utterances advocating the overthrow of organized government
by force, violence and unlawful means, are so inimical to the general welfare
and involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be penalized in the
exercise of its police power. That determination must be given great weight.
Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of the statute.
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Smith contains a vast amount of quotation and citation of medical and
other special authors-much more, indeed, than it does of strictly legal
argument.) And outside of the briefs the justices will no doubt do
some exploring as to the facts on their own initiative. (Mr. Justice
Wiest's opinion shows a great deal in the way of special reading which
cannot be accounted for by the briefs of counsel in the present case.)
The difficulty with these ways of getting at the facts is not much
different from the difficulty we would see in having the jury get its
knowledge anywhere and everywhere. The facts simply cannot be
adequately tested and proved without some real opportunity to explain
and controvert, and even more important, without a real opportunity for
the court itself to investigate the facts. In the case before us we
see brought out the weakness of these haphazard ways of getting at the
facts. We find the justices taking judicial notice of more than one
medical or scientific fact "that ain't so." The writer has already
spoken of the remarks of Mr. Justice Clark on the sexual inclinations
of the feeble-minded. And the opinion of Mr. Justice Wiest shows
several instances of the assumption of medical truths which cannot
be supported. Indeed, a reading of all the opinions will convince anyone familiar with the subject that none of the justices understands very
well the natfire of the social problems arising from feeble-mindedness
or the medical procedures in sterilization, though the nature of these
problems and the seriousness of the treatment or operation seem to be
highly important in deciding whether sterilization is an arbitrary and
unconstitutional measure. But it is not at all the writer's purpose to
play the carping critic of the court for its lack of information in
medical and psychological matters; everyone must appreciate that busy
justices cannot go to the bottom of every scientific question coming
before the court. Rather the writer's point in this discussion is to
stress the difficulties confronting the court in these matters and to
draw a moral, which is quite properly recognized in the majority
opinions-the court should indulge every presumption in favor of the
existence of facts which the legislature assumed and acted upon, or
what amounts to the same thing, the court ought to require the facts
on the basis of which the constitutionality of a law is assailed to be
established by the assailant "beyond a reasonable doubt."

